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EXTENDING WINTERS TO WATER QUALITY:
ALLOWING GROUNDWATER FOR HATCHERIES
Amy Choyce Allison
Abstract: The Winters Doctrine of federally reserved water rights applies to
groundwater and water quality. Because most Indian tribes would have no water rights under
state law, the reserved water rights doctrine, lknown as the Winters Doctrine, emerged to
establish a federal right to water on Indian reservations sufficient to fulfill the purposes of the
reservation. The reserved water rights doctrine originated in Winters v. United States, which
was preceded by two cases upholding the federal government's right to reserve certain water
rights. Winters rested on one of the Canons of Construction for Indian treaties that require
agreements involving Indians be liberally construed in their favor. Whether Winters applies to
water quality as well as quantity has never been directly litigated. However, courts have
implied that this right extends to water quality by upholding water uses that do not actually
require consumption of water, such as maintenance of minimum instream flows. Winters and
the Canons of Construction also require an extension to water quality. This Comment uses the
Lummi Nation to illustrate a real example of water rights problems faced by Indian tribes and
concludes that because the Winters Doctrine extends to groundwater and water quality, the
Lummi Nation is entitled to enjoin non-Indian groundwater users contaminating their
groundwater source.
The Lummi Nation of Western Washington has always depended on
salmon fishing for its livelihood and culture. But, during the past
decade, salmon resources available to the Lummi have begun dwindling
due to pollution, logging practices, and dams on salmon streams.2 These
activities have caused some areas of the Nooksack river to reach high
temperatures fatal to salmon.3 In order to preserve and manage salmon
populations, the Lummi have introduced fish hatcheries on the
reservation.'
The Lummi's efforts to rescue the diminishing salmon population are
at risk of failure.' While hatcheries can help recover naturally spawning
populations of salmon, they require fresh, high quality water to function
1. See Don Newman Taylor, Changes In The Economy Of the Lummi Indians of Northwest
Washington 16 (1969) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Western Washington University) (on file with
author); Kurt Russo, The Lummi Indian Tribe and Life with the Salmon, at
http//vwrw.sustainable.org/casestudieslwashingtonWA-afLummi.html (last modified Sept. 18,
1996).
2. See Russo, supra note 1.
3. See id.
4. See id. Hatcheries are pools of fresh water where fish are artificially raised and were first
established in the late 19th century to combat diminishing natural fish runs. See United States v.
Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1360 (9th Cir. 1985).
5. See Russo, supra note 1.
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successfully.6 The Lummi have relied on groundwater underlying the
reservation because the surface water available to them is of poor
quality.7 However, the underground water source is in danger because the
State of Washington has issued permits to withdraw the groundwater,
and other landowners have pumped the groundwater! This has resulted
in overuse and salt-water intrusion into the reservation's fresh
groundwater.' The United States has filed suit on behalf of the Lummi in
the Western District of Washington to remedy this intrusion, presenting a
dilemma for the courts. 10
The court that hears the Lummi case will have the opportunity to
apply the reserved water rights doctrine, also known as the Winters
Doctrine, to the groundwater in order to preserve the quality of the
Lummi's water. In Winters v. United States," the U.S. Supreme Court
held that Congress impliedly reserved enough water for the Indians to
fulfill the purposes of their reservation. 2 The scope and extent of the
Winters Doctrine is a treaty-based inquiry that requires courts to liberally
interpret treaties and other documents establishing reservations under the
Canons of Construction.13
Yet, the scope of Winters is uncertain with regard to water quality. 4
No court has specifically extended Winters to water quality.
Nevertheless, courts have allowed water rights for non-consumptive
uses, such as maintenance of instream river flows and preservation of
certain water temperatures for fish survival. 5 In addition, the Supreme
Court of Arizona broke new ground by extending Winters to
groundwater when surface water is inadequate. 6
6. Telephone Interview with Greg Johnston, Certified Fisheries Professional (July 20, 2002).
7. See Russo, supra note 1; United States' Complaint, United States v. Washington, Western
District of Washington, 8-9 (Jan. 19, 2001) (No. CO1-0047Z). For purposes of this Comment, the
assertions in the Complaint are assumed to be true.
8. United States' Complaint at 8-9, Washington (No. C01-0047Z).
9. Id.
10. See id
11. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
12. Id. at 576-77; Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138-39 (1976).
13. See Winters, 207 U.S. at 576-77; see also infra Part II.
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1411 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Anderson,
591 F. Supp. 1, 5-6 (E.D. Wash. 1982), rev'd in part, aff'd in part, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984).
See also infra Part III.B.
16. See In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water In the Gila River Sys. & Source, 989
P.2d 739, 745-48 (Ariz. 1999) [hereinafter Gila III].
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This Comment argues that the Winters Doctrine reserves groundwater
of sufficient quality, as well as quantity, to fulfill the purposes of Indian
reservations when surface water is inadequate. The experience of the
Lummi Nation illustrates the Winters Doctrine when applied to tribes
maintaining fish hatcheries on reservations. Part I of this Comment
discusses water law in general. Part II explains the Winters Doctrine of
reserved water rights. Part III discusses the scope of reserved water
rights, including how water is quantified, how courts have upheld water
rights for non-consumptive uses, and whether Winters applies to
groundwater. Part IV argues that tribes have a right to a quality of
groundwater sufficient to fulfill the purposes of their reservation when
surface water is inadequate. Part IV then applies this argument to the
Lummi as an example of a fishing tribe using water for fish hatcheries.
I. WATER RIGHTS, THE WEST, AND PRIOR APPROPRIATION
Water rights, unlike other property rights, are held "in common for the
public good" 7 and are not subject to a possessory interest.' 8 An
individual cannot own water. 9 Instead, he or she can own the right to use
water.2°
With the exception of federally reserved water rights, the laws
governing water rights vary as a matter of state law.2' The Equal Footing
Doctrine provides that the United States holds title to navigable
waterways on submerged land in trust for the states, and the states
receive the title when they are admitted to the Union. Moreover, the
Desert Land Act' requires water rights belonging to recipients of federal
lands to be determined by and subject to state water law.24 The federal
government must comply with state law when obtaining water rights for
17. CHRISTINE GREGOIRE ET AL., AN INTRODUCrIoN TO WASHINGTON WATER LAW 1 (2000).
18. See A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES 3-12-3-13 (2002 ed.).
19. See GREGOIRE, supra note 17, at 1.1-1.2; TARLOCK, supra note 18, at 3-13.
20. See GREGOIRE, supra note 17, at 1.1-1.2; TARLOCK, supra note 18, at 3-12-3-12.1.
21. See Murphy v. Kerr, 296 F. 536, 540 (D.N.M. 1923) (stating that "waters are owned by the
state in trust for the people"); see also GREGOIRE, supra note 17, at 1:5, 111:1. Water quality and
pollution issues are usually determined by state and federal pollution control programs like the Clean
Water Act. See TARLOCK, supra note 18, at 2-9.
22. See TARLOCK, supra note 18, at 8-8.
23. Codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-23, 325, 327-29 (2002).
24. See id; Cappaert v. United States, 508 F.2d 313, 318 (1974); FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 577 (1982 ed.); Todd A. Fisher, Note, The Winters of Our Discontent:
Federal Reserved Water Rights In the Western States, 69 CORNELL L REV. 1077, 1081 (1984).
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federal lands.2 ' However, land that has been reserved by the federal
government is not subject to state law.26
In the West, state courts apply the doctrine of prior appropriation to
surface water rights.2 ' This doctrine establishes a "prior in time, prior in
right" notion.28 The first individual to put water to a beneficial use gets
29priority as long as he or she continues using the water. In water
shortages, the first users can require the "junior" users to stop using
water.3 Consequently, the issue of timing is essential.
Groundwater has traditionally been treated differently than surface
water.3 Most courts originally granted the owners of the overlying land
absolute rights to underlying groundwater sources under the absolute
ownership rule. 2 A few states still follow this rule.3 Yet, other rules
have emerged in other states. For example, the correlative rights rule
allows for equitable sharing of the groundwater source.34 A third rule, the
reasonable use rule, allows owners to take all water required for
reasonable use of the overlying land .35 Finally, some western states have
applied the prior appropriation doctrine to groundwater as well as surface
water, usually by statute.36 For example, in 1945 the Washington
Legislature enacted laws extending the prior appropriation standard to
25. See Fisher, supra note 24, at 1081.
26. See Fed. Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435,498 (1955); Fisher, supra note 24, at 1081.
27. See GREGOIRE, supra note 17, at 3. States that use some form of the prior appropriation
doctrine include: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington,
and Wyoming. See TARLOCK, supra note 18, at 5-10-5-20; Fisher, supra note 24, at 1077 n.2.
Courts in the eastern United States generally use the doctrine of riparian rights which allows persons
owning the land adjacent, over or under the water to make reasonable and beneficial use of the
water. See GREGOIRE, supra note 17, at 3. In times of insufficiency, equal shares of the water are
reduced proportionally. See GREGOIRE, supra note 17, at 3.
28. See TARLOCK, supra note 18, at 5-52. Washington has also embraced the prior appropriation
doctrine through legislation by establishing a permit system for surface water use. WASH. REV.
CODE § 90.03.250-.340 (2002).
29. See TARLOCK, supra note 18, at 5-48-5-49, 5-112.4.
30. See GREGOIRE, supra note 17, at 3; TARLOCK, supra note 18, at 5-50-5-51.
31. See TARLOCK, supra note 18, at 4-2.
32. See id. at 4-6.
33. See id. at 4-8 (naming Texas, Connecticut, Louisiana, Maine, and Rhode Island).
34. See id. at at 4-20 (discussing the rule of correlative rights in California). For a discussion on
the common law principles of groundwater in Washington, see GREGOIRE, supra note 17, at V:4.
35. See TARLOCK, supra note 18, at 4-10-4-11 (discussing the reasonable use rule).
36. See William Wilcox, Jr., Maintaining Federal Water Rights in the Western United States,
ARMY LAW 3, 4 (Oct. 1996).
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groundwater.37 With few exceptions, the Washington groundwater code
requires a water user to obtain a permit before pumping groundwater and
resembles the surface water code that requires a permit for surface water
use.
38
If. INDIAN TRIBES HAVE A FEDERALLY IMPLIED RIGHT TO
WATER THAT TAKES PRIORITY OVER NON-INDIAN
USERS
The reserved water rights doctrine gives Indian tribes an opportunity
to use water without having to comply with state law. 9 Without such
rights, tribes in the west would rarely receive water because of the
complicated priority system employed in western state water law.40 Prior
to Winters, the U. S. Supreme Court held that the federal government can
reserve certain rights4 and that Indians retain rights not ceded by treaty.42
In Winters, the Court granted Indians on reservations an implied right to
water sufficient to fulfill the purposes of the reservation. 3 The legal basis
for reserved water rights is provided by the Canons of Construction,
which are rules for interpreting documents dealing with Indians.' These
water rights also stem from the federal government's ability to reserve
certain rights for the Indians.45 Reserved water rights are favorable to
Indians because they do not carry the strict requirements of state water
law in the West.
46
37. 1945 Wash. Laws ch. 263 § 3 (codified in WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44 (2002)).
38. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.050. Permits are not required for stock watering, lawn watering,
domestic uses in an amount not exceeding five thousand gallons a day, and industrial purposes not
exceeding five thousand gallons a day. See GREGOIRE, supra note 17, at V:10; see also WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 90.03.250-.340 (establishing a mandatory permit system for surface water use).
39. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1908).
40. See supra Part I; see also A. Dan Tarlock, One River, Three Sovereigns: Indian and Interstate
Water Rights, 22 LAND & WATER L REV. 631, 633 (1987) (stating that "tribes seldom had the
financial capability to put their potential reserved rights to actual beneficial use").
41. See United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690,703 (1899).
42. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381-83 (1905).
43. See Winters, 207 U.S. at 576-78.
44. See Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation:
"As Long as Water Flows or Grass Grows Upon the Earth"--How Long a Time Is That?, 63 CAL.
L REV. 601,608-19 (1975); DAVID GETCHES, FEDERAL INMIAN LAW 129-39 (4th ed. 1998).
45. See Winters, 207 U.S. at 577.
46. See id.; Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 51-52 (9th Cir. 1981); Berrie
Martinis, From Quantification to Qualification: A State Court's Distortion of the Law in In re
General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water In the Big Horn River System, 68 WASH. L. REV.
435,448 (1993).
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A. Pre-Winters Case Law Establishing the Federal Reservation of
Water Rights
Until 1908, no courts had considered whether a reserved water right
for federal reservations existed. 7 Yet, several U. S. Supreme Court cases
provided significant legal background for the federal reservation of water
rights. 8 The first, United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co.,4 9
held that the federal government could preserve the navigability of
rivers.50 The second, United States v. Winans,5' held that certain Indian
treaty rights trumped state law. 2
States may govern their own property and water laws with a few
salient exceptions.' The Court examined one such exception in Rio
Grande Dam when it considered whether the United States retained any
rights over a non-navigable tributary of the Rio Grande River. 4 The
defendant dam builders had planned to build a dam on the tributary and
divert water for irrigation.5 They had complied with all state laws
regarding dam building and diversion of public waters. 6 Thus,
construction of the dam was allowed under state law. The United States
argued, however, that the defendant dam builders should be enjoined
from building a dam that hindered the downstream navigability of the
river.5
7
The Supreme Court agreed and held that the jurisdiction of the federal
government over interstate commerce allows it to preserve the
navigability of water courses "even against any state action.""8 Although
the Court recognized the ability of a state to govern its own water law, it
47. See TARLOCK, supra note 18, at 9-71.
48. See United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899); United
States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371,382 (1905); see also GREGOIPE, supra note 17, at VIII:3; Worcester
v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 557 (1832) (holding that state regulatory law was inapplicable on Indian
reservations).
49. 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
50. Id. at 703.
51. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
52. Id. at 382-83.
53. See Rio Grande Dam, 174 U.S. at 702-03; Winans, 198 U.S. at 382.
54. See Rio Grande Dam, 174 U.S. at 690.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 692-93.
57. Id. at 690-92.
58. Id. at 703.
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acknowledged a limitation on this right.5 9 Specifically, the Court stated
that
in the absence of specific authority from Congress a State cannot
by its legislation destroy the right of the United States, as the owner
of lands bordering on a stream, to the continued flow of its waters;
so far... as may be necessary for the beneficial uses of the
government property.60
Thus, the Court held in Rio Grande that the federal government has the
ability to reserve certain federal water rights."
Six years later, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Indians have
reserved rights not ceded by treaties in United States v. Winans.' In
Winans, the Court considered whether treaty fishing rights allowing
Indians to take fish in common with the citizens of a territory survived
after the federal government conveyed the land out of the public
domain." The United States brought suit on behalf of the Indians when
the defendants took virtually all the fish in the river and made Indian
fishing physically impossible." The defendants built fishing devices,
called fish wheels, on the Columbia River pursuant to licenses given by
the State of Washington. 5 The United States asked the court to enjoin
use of the fish wheels.6 The defendants argued that by complying with
state law, they had a legal right to maintain the fish wheels67 and that the
state had control over the shorelines under the Equal Footing Doctrine. 8
Under this doctrine, states are admitted to the union on an equal footing
with the original states, giving them ownership of water shorelines. 9
In Winans the Supreme Court held that treaties and federal law, not
state law, define Indian fishing rights.70 Further, the Court held that these
59. Id. at 702-03.
60. Id. at 703.
61. Id.
62. 198 U.S. 371,381 (1905).
63. Id. at 379. Public domain refers to land owned by the United States. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1229 (6th ed. 1990).
64. Id. at 380.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 377.
67. Id. at 379.
68. Id. at 382-83.
69. See TARLOCK, supra note 18, at 8-5-8-9.
70. Winans, 198 U.S. at 382; see also COHEN, supra note 24, at 581 (stating that Winans
established this principle later relied upon in Winters).
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rights survive the state's power to control riverbeds under the Equal
Footing Doctrine. 7' Thus, the Court required the private landowners to
allow Indians access to fishing areas, essentially granting the Indians an
easement.72 The Court also required the defendants to stop using the fish
wheels, 73 declaring that "the treaty was not a grant of rights to the
Indians, but a... reservation of those not [ceded]."' Therefore, Winans
established the notion that Indians retain all rights not ceded and
confirmed the federal government's ability to reserve certain rights even
after they have been conveyed out of the public domain.75
B. Winters v. United States
Strictly applying the prior appropriation doctrine to Indian
reservations would severely limit tribes' use of water because few tribes
put water to beneficial use first, few continued to put it to beneficial use,
and few complied with the respective state's procedural requirements.76
Moreover, most rivers are over-appropriated and have been for some
time.77 The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the problem of prior
appropriation and Indian Reservations in Winters v. United States.7"
In Winters, the Court considered whether Indians on the Fort Belknap
Reservation had an implied right to water allowing them to enjoin non-
Indian dam builders from building dams or otherwise preventing water
flow to the reservation.79 The case turned on interpretation of the 1888
treaty establishing the Fort Belknap Reservation." The tribes agreed
71. Winans, 198 U.S. at 382-83.
72. Id. at 384.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 381.
75. See id. at 381-83.
76. See, e.g., Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. at 571 (1908); Colville Confederated Tribes v.
Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 46 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Tarlock, supra note 40, at 633 (stating that "tribes
seldom had the financial capability to put their potential reserved rights to actual beneficial use, even
with subsidies"). Even in the fifty years following Winters, the federal government did nothing to
protect or define Indian water rights. See NAT'L WATER COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE
FUTURE: FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 474-75
(June 1973); see also GETCHES, supra note 44, at 833.
77. See Report of the Western Water Policy Review Advisory Commission, Water in the West:
Challenge for the Next Century, 3-6 (June 1998).
78. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
79. Id. at 565.
80. 25 Stat. 113, 213 (1888).
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under the treaty to cede a large area of land to the federal government."
The treaty reserved the land for the creation of "a permanent home and
abiding place" for the tribes at issue.82 In addition, the government's
policy was to establish the reservation in order to change Indians into
"pastoral and civilized people." s3 However, the agreement was silent on
water rights. 4 Montana settlers, ditch companies, and irrigation
companies took advantage of this silence by diverting water upstream
from the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation. These diversions allegedly
deprived the Indians of the use of water from the Milk River. 6
The federal government brought suit on behalf of the Indians to enjoin
dam building or any other water diversion. 7 Under the prior
appropriation doctrine, the settlers would have won due to their
beneficial use of the water prior to the Indians."8 Consequently, the
United States alleged that because water was necessary to further the
purposes of the reservation, Congress had implied water rights in the
Treaty. 9 The defendants contended that the Indians had given up their
water rights when they ceded their land.9" Further, the defendants argued
that the Indians' failure to reserve water rights for themselves must have
been conscious because the lands ceded to the government for settlement
were valueless without water.9'
The Winters Court held that the treaty implied a water right for tribes
on the reservation under the rules of Indian treaty interpretation.92 The
Court's statement that "ambiguities occurring will be resolved from the
standpoint of the Indians"'93 has become known as one of the Canons of
Construction for Indian treaties.94 The Court noted that there was an
81. Winters, 207 U.S. at 567.
82. Id. at 565 (quoting 25 Stat. 113,213 (1888)).
83. Id. at 576.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 569.
86. Id. at 567.
87. Id. at 565.
88. Id. at 566.
89. Id. at 567.
90. Id. at 576.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 576-77.
93. Id. at 576.
94. See COHEN, supra note 24, at 221. The three Canons of Construction are: (1) ambiguous terms
or words must be resolved in favor of the Indian parties concerned, (2) Indian treaties must be
interpreted as the Indians themselves would have understood them, and (3) the treaty's meaning or
purpose must be liberally construed in favor of the Indians. See Wilkinson, supra note 44, at 608-17.
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ambiguity in the agreement establishing the reservation because it was
silent on water rights.95 Therefore a "conflict of implications" arose.96
One implication was that a water right was implied because the Indians
realized that the purpose of the reservation, to become civilized and
pastoral, would not be met without water.97 Another implication was that
the Indians impliedly waived their water rights because they realized that
the ceded land was valueless without irrigation, and failed to reserve
water rights.98 But, construing this ambiguity from the standpoint of the
Indians led the Winters Court to conclude that Indians were not aware
that by accepting the reservation, they gave up the rights to make it
prosperous. 9 When the Indians agreed to relocate to the reservation, they
would not have contemplated having to expressly reserve water rights."
The Court resolved the ambiguity in favor of the Indians and thereby
established an implied right to water on Indian reservations sufficient to
fulfill the purpose of the reservation.''
In Winters, the Court established that although state law generally
governs water rights, federally reserved water rights are not subject to
state law."0 2 Like the defendants in Winans, the defendants in Winters
argued that the Equal Footing Doctrine gave states the right to determine
all water rights. 3 The Court disagreed, citing Rio Grande Dam and
Winans for the proposition that the state's right to regulate water is
subject to the federal government's reservation of certain rights.' The
Court recognized that the agreement contained an implied water right in
1888, when the reservation was established.'0 5 The Winters Court
reasoned that Congress must have intended the implied water right to be
continued throughout the years, and not be revoked a year later with the
The Canons are comparable to rules of construction for adhesion contracts. See Wilkinson, supra
note 44, at 617.
95. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576-77.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 577.
100. See id.
101. Id. at 576-77. See also Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976).
102. See United States v. Winters, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908). See also Colville Confederated
Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42,46 (9th Cir. 1981); Martinis, supra note 46, at 448.
103. See Winters, 207 U.S. at 577. For discussion on the Equal Footing Doctrine see supra note
22 and accompanying text.
104. See Winters, 207 U.S. at 577.
105. Id. at 576-77.
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admission of Montana to the Union.' 6 Thus, in Winters the Court
established the reserved water rights doctrine, which has come to be
known as the Winters Doctrine.1°7
C. The Unique Nature of Winters Rights In the Reservation Context
Courts and commentators have recognized that the Winters Doctrine
provides three unique privileges: first, reserved water rights may be
asserted at any time; ' s second, they are need-based and thus do not
require continued beneficial use;0 9 and third, they take priority over all
junior water users in water shortages.' 0 These characteristics have
become apparent in cases subsequent to Winters and by various
commentators' and have been collectively referred to as "Winters
rights.""112 Applied in the context of an Indian reservation, Winters rights
guarantee an adequate water supply to fulfill the purposes of the
reservation.' 3 Many tribes benefit from the safeguards offered in Winters
to fulfill the purposes of their reservations."'
Winters rights can be asserted at any time."5 The priority date-the
date the water right commences-depends on the nature of the reserved
water rights." 6 For example, treaty confirmed aboriginal rights,"7 such as
106. Id. at 577.
107. See eg., Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 116 n.1 (1983); In re Gen. Adjudication of
All Rights To Use Water In the Gila River Sys. and Source (Gila IV), 35 P.3d 68,71 (Ariz. 2001).
108. See Taiavvagi Helton, Indian Reserved Water Rights in the Dual-System State of Oklahoma,
33 TuLSA L.J. 979, 990 (1998); Fisher, supra note 24, at 1090.
109. See COHEN, supra note 24, at 578; Fisher, supra note 24, at 1090; Helton, supra note 108, at
990; Harold A. Ranquist, The Winters Doctrine and How It Grew: Federal Reservation of Rights to
the Use of Water, 1975 BYU L. REv. 639, 655 (1975).
110. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976); COHEN, supra note 24, at 578;
Helton, supra note 108, at 990.
111. See eg., COHEN, supra note 24, at 578; Fisher, supra note 24, at 1090; Helton, supra note
108, at 990; Harold A. Ranquist, The Winters Doctrine and How It Grew: Federal Reservation of
Rights to the Use of Water, 1975 BYUL. REV. 639,655 (1975).
112. See, e-g., Gila IV, 35 P.3d at 77; In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the
Big Horn River Sys., 899 P.2d 848, 854 (Wyo. 1995).
113. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564,576-78 (1908).
114. See, eg., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 599-601 (1963); United States v. Adair, 723
F.2d 1394, 1408-11 (9th Cir. 1984); Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 46-47
(9th Cir. 1981); Gila V, 35 P. 3d at 71-73; Gila 111, 989 P.2d 739, 745 (Ariz. 1999).
115. See Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 138; Helton, supra note 108, at 990; Fisher, supra note 24, at
1090.
116. See United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1412-15 (9th Cir. 1984).
117. Aboriginal rights are rights to use and occupy. See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 574
(1823); GErCHE-, supra note 44, at 70.
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the right to hunt and fish in all usual and accustomed places, carry a
priority date of time immemorial." 8 Indian users with a priority date of
time immemorial take priority over all non-Indian users, no matter when
the reservation was established." 9
All other implied water rights vest on the date the federal reservation
was established. 2  These rights carry a priority date of the establishment
of the reservation.' 2 ' Thus, under prior appropriation, Winters rights
trump all other uses that were established after the reservation." This is
in contrast to the general prior appropriation doctrine that gives priority
to the first water user to establish a beneficial use.'2 Consequently, tribes
on reservations in western states receive implied water rights senior to
non-reservation users as long as the government created the reservation
before any other user could put the water to use.
2 4
Second, unlike prior appropriation, Winters rights do not depend on
any continued beneficial use. 125 Water users under state law must
continually put their water to use, or lose the right to use it. 6 By
contrast, water users with Winters rights can let their water lie dormant
for years before using it.' 27 Winters rights are need-based rights instead
of use-based rights. 2 Thus, as long as a federally reserved piece of land
needs water to satisfy its purpose, a water right exists. 9 The Winters
118. See Adair, 723 F.2d at 1412-15; COHEN, supra note 24, at 578 n.20; GREGOIRE, supra note
17, at VIII:7. But see Martinez v. Lewis, 861 P.2d 235, 238 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (refusing to
address a tribe's reserved water right claim with a priority date of time immemorial).
119. See Adair, 724 F.2d at 1412-15.
120. See id.; COHEN, supra note 24, at 578.
121. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976); GREGOIRE, supra note 17, at
VIII:6.
122. Although the federal right is limited by state law because Winters rights only take priority
over non-Indian uses that commence after the reservation is established, this issue does not usually
arise in the Indian reservation context. See Helton, supra note 108, at 989; GREGOIRE, supra note 17,
at VIII:7. This is because most Indian reservations were established before any other user could
claim a water use. See Helton, supra note 108, at 989; GREGOIRE, supra note 17, at VIII:7.
123. See COHEN, supra note 24, at 578; Helton, supra note 108, at 990.
124. See Adair, 724 F.2d at 1412-15, COHEN, supra note 24, at 578.
125. See COHEN, supra note 24, at 578; Fisher, supra note 24, at 1090; Helton, supra note 108, at
990; Ranquist, supra note 109, at 655.
126. See TARLOCK, supra note 18, at 5-112.4.
127. See Fisher, supra note 24, at 1090.
128. See Helton, supra note 108, at 990-91 (stating that Winters rights are based on the existence
of reserved land in need of water).
129. See id. at 991.
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Doctrine is meant to provide enough water to satisfy present and future
needs. 3
Third, consistent with the doctrine of prior appropriation's priority
system, users with Winters rights are not required to share water with
other users in water shortages. 3' During a water shortage, non-
reservation users with a late priority must stop using the water until the
purposes of the reservation are met.'32 Read together, these three points
illustrate the elevated status the courts have afforded Winters rights and
the priority they receive over other water users.
m. THE SCOPE OF WINTERS RIGHTS
The scope of Winters rights has been heavily litigated.'33 Courts are
often called upon to quantify water rights on Indian reservations.'
These courts quantify the amount of water necessary to fulfill the
purpose of the reservation and no more. 3 ' Courts have utilized several
methods to quantify water. First, the traditional practicably irrigable
acreage standard allows tribes enough water to irrigate tribal land.
3 6
Second, preservation of instream flows allows tribes to maintain a certain
quantity of water to stay in streams to protect fish populations.'37 Third, a
new multifaceted approach quantifies water based on factors including
history, culture, geography, economic base, and past water use. 38 No
courts have explicitly extended the scope of Winters rights to water
quality. Courts are divided on whether Winters rights extend to
groundwater.'
130. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600-01 (1963); United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation
Dist., 236 F.2d 321,326 (9th Cir. 1956).
131. See COHEN, supra note 24, at 578; Helton, supra note 108, at 990.
132. See COHEN, supra note 24, at 578; Helton, supra note 108, at 990.
133. See, e.g., United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1408-11 (9th Cir. 1956); United States v.
Anderson, 591 F. Supp. 1, 4-9 (E.D. Wash. 1982), rev'd in part. aff'd in part, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th
Cir. 1984); Gila IV, 35 P.3d 68, 73-81 (Ariz. 2001); Gila III, 989 P.2d 739, 742-50 (Ariz. 1999); In
re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River Sys., 753 P.2d 76, 99-100
(Wyo. 1988) [hereinafter Big Horn].
134. See, e.g., Arizona, 373 U.S. at 600-01; Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 100-12.
135. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976).
136. See Arizona, 373 U.S. at 600-01.
137. See Adair, 723 F.2d at 1417;Anderson, 591 F. Supp. at 5.
138. See Gila IV, 35 P.3d at 80.
139. Compare Gila III, 989 P.2d 739, 745 (Ariz.1999), with Big Horn, 753 P.2d 76, 100 (Wyo.
1988).
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A. Quantifying Water For Indian Reservations
Courts quantify water according to the purpose of the reservation, 4 '
thereby limiting how much water a tribe receives. 4 ' Once a court
determines the purpose of a reservation, it is sometimes asked to quantify
the water needed to fulfill that purpose. 4 2 Courts have awarded water for
consumptive uses like irrigation of agricultural land,"' and for non-
consumptive uses like maintaining instream flows' and water
temperature. 4 '
Indians on reservations are limited to using only enough water
necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation. 46 The U.S Supreme
Court, in Winters, allowed the Indians water because without it the
purposes of the reservation, providing a pastoral homeland and lifestyle,
could not have been fulfilled. 47 Water that is used in excess of the right
or water that is used for non-reservation purposes is subject to state water
law. 48 Therefore, courts are faced with the essential task of determining
the purpose of the reservation. 49 Some courts have applied a narrow
interpretation to Indian reservations, finding very specific agricultural
purposes. 5 ' Other courts have defined purpose broadly, finding several
140. See Adair, 723 F.2d at 1408-09; Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 99-101 (finding a sole agricultural
purpose to the reservation and applying the practicably irrigable acreage standard to measure the
water right).
141. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 702 (1978); see also Cappaert v. United
States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976). Another possible backstop to the implied right to water is the
"sensitivity doctrine" which "requires reserved water rights to be quantified with sensitivity to the
impact on state and private appropriators." See Andrew C. Mergen & Sylvia F. Liu, A Misplaced
Sensitivity: The Draft Opinions In Wyoming v. United States, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 683, 702 (1997);
see also NAT'L WATER COMM'N, supra note 76, at 481 (recommending that the United States
provide water from alternative sources or compensate Indians when fulfilling the Winters right
would impair non-Indian use).
142. See Adair, 723 F.2d at 1408-09; Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 99-101.
143. See Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 100-12.
144. See Adair, 723 F.2d at 1417-18.
145. See United States v. Anderson, 591 F. Supp. 1, 5-6 (E.D. Wash. 1982), rev'd in part afl'd
in part, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984).
146. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976); Adair, 723 F.2d at 1408-09.
147. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908).
148. See Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42,46 (9th Cir. 1981).
149. See, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 702 (1978); Cappaert, 426 U.S. at
141; Gila IV, 35 P.3d 68, 73-77 (Ariz. 2001); Big Horn, 753 P.2d 76, 94-99 (Wyo. 1988).
150. See, e.g., Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 94-98 (finding the primary purpose of the Wind River
Indian Reservation was apparent from treaty language referring to agriculture).
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primary purposes in Indian reservations."' A few courts have broadly
stated that the purpose of all reservations is simply to create a permanent
homeland.' Under this interpretation, purpose encompasses a wide
array of water use on reservations and reserves water for uses that were
not necessarily contemplated at the time of the creation of the
reservation.'
After courts determine the purpose of a reservation, they must often
quantify the water needed to fulfill that purpose. 4 Courts have used
several methods to quantify the water available under Winters rights.'
The Practicably Irrigable Acreage (PIA) standard was introduced in
Arizona v. California56 and has been traditionally used to quantify water
for reservations created with agricultural purposes.'57 In Arizona, the
U.S. Supreme Court determined the water rights of the Colorado River
and its tributaries."' The case was referred to a special master to
recommend a decree because the litigation involved Arizona, California,
Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and several Indian tribes.' 9 The special
master introduced the PIA standard to quantify water rights on the Indian
reservations."16 The PIA standard allows tribes enough water to irrigate
all of the acres on the reservation that are practical to irrigate. 6 ' This
151. See Adair, 723 F.2d at 1409 (finding two primary purposes of the Indian reservation: fishing
and agriculture); Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 47-48 (9th Cir. 1981)
(considering the historical importance of fishing and finding both a fishing and agricultural purpose);
see also COHEN, supra note 24, at 584 ("[T]he relevant inquiry in ascertaining Indian reserved rights
is not whether a particular use is primary or secondary but whether it is completely outside the scope
of a reservation's purposes.").
152. See, e.g., Adair, 723 F.2d at 1410; Colville Confederated Tribes, 647 F.2d at 47-48.
153. See Ranquist, supra note 109, at 658; see also United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236
F.2d 321, 327 (9th Cir. 1956) (stating that the right to use water "was not limited to the use of the
Indians at any given date but this right extended to the ultimate needs of the Indians as those needs
and requirements should grow").
154. See, eg., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 595-601 (1963); Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 100-
12; United States v. Anderson, 591 F. Supp. 1, 5-6 (E.D. Wash 1982), rev'd in part, aff'd in part,
736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984).
155. Compare Arizona, 373 U.S. at 600-01 (using the practicable irrigable acreage standard),
with Anderson, 591 F. Supp. at 5-6 (quantifying enough water to keep a creek's temperature below
68 degrees).
156. 373 U.S. 546, 600-01 (1963).
157. See, e.g., Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 100-01; see also Tarlock, supra note 76 at 662-71
(discussing the use of the PIA standard in water rights settlements); TARLOCK, supra note 18, at 9-
76 (stating that practicable irrigable acreage remains the presumptive standard).
158. See Arizona, 373 U.S. at 551.
159. Id. at 550-51.
160. Id. at 600.
161. Id.
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type of analysis involves examining factors such as soil, slope, drainage,
and economic feasibility to determine how much of the reservation land
is irrigable 62 The state of Arizona rejected this standard, arguing that
quantification should be based on the tribes' "reasonably foreseeable
needs.' 63 The Court, however, disagreed and concluded that the
reasonably foreseeable needs approach would create too much
uncertainty and adopted the PIA standard as the only fair way to quantify
reserved water on reservations.'4 Arizona is still the only case in which
the U.S. Supreme Court has quantified reserved water rights. 6
In In re General Adjudication of All Rights To Use Water In the Gila
River System and Source [hereinafter Gila ] 1 66 the Supreme Court of
Arizona held that the U.S. Supreme Court did not intend for the PIA
standard to be the sole method for quantification. 67 After determining
that the purpose of all Indian reservations was to provide a homeland, the
court concluded that the PIA standard was flawed.'68 The U.S. and
several tribes argued that prior cases had determined that the PIA
standard must be used. The court reasoned, however, that the PIA
standard was advantageous for tribes with land conducive to agriculture
but was unfair to tribes on mountainous land or land that could not be
irrigated. 69 In addition, the court stated that the PIA standard forced
tribes to become agricultural even though farming is sometimes risky. 7
Although the court did not completely disregard the PIA standard, stating
"future irrigation projects are subject to a PIA-type analysis... ,,"' it
expressly required a multifaceted approach instead of a strict PIA
approach.'72 Under the multifaceted approach, the court called for
consideration of the tribe's history, culture, geography, economic base,
infrastructure, and past water use to determine the water necessary to
fulfill the homeland purposes of the reservation. The case was then
162. See GETCHES, supra note 44, at 833.
163. See Arizona, 373 U.S. at 600-01.
164. Id. at 601.
165. See Jennele Morris O'Hair, The Federal Reserved Rights Doctrine and Practicably Irrigable
Acreage: Past, Present, and Future, 10 BYU J. PUB. L. 263, 273 (1996).
166. 35 P.3d 68, (Ariz. 2001).
167. See id. at 79.
168. See id. at 78-79.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 80.
172. Id. at 79.
173. Id. at 79-81.
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remanded to the trial court to implement the multifaceted approach. 74
Thus, Gila IV broke new ground in holding that the U.S. Supreme
Court's PIA standard was not appropriate for all Indian tribes.
B. A Strong Relationship Exists Between Water Quality and Quantity
Courts frequently imply that water rights on Indian reservations allow
a certain quality of water as well as quantity, although no court has ever
spoken to the issue directly. 75 For example, a federal district court in the
District of Arizona found that quantity alone is insufficient when
granting tribes water for consumptive uses in United States v. Gila Valley
Irrigation District.'76 Although it never considered Winters rights, the
court awarded a certain quality of water for Indian agricultural use.
177
The district court held that users upstream from a reservation had to
cease using water in order to allow the tribe water of sufficient quality.
178
In Gila Valley, the court considered a 1935 Consent Decree that provided
for a system of priorities, based on the law of prior appropriation. 179 The
Decree provided the Apache tribe with 6,000 acre feet per year"' and
gave them a right to the "natural flow" of the stream.' Because of
farming and groundwater pumping in the upper valleys, the tribe's water
was becoming concentrated with salt because the flow rate was
diminished." 2 This high salt concentration forced the Apache tribe to
stop growing some salt-sensitive crops.' The Gila Valley court held that
injunctive relief was necessary to restore the water to a sufficient quality
to sustain the salt-sensitive crops that were grown by the tribe at the time
of the Decree."s
Courts recognize that where a primary purpose of a reservation is
fishing, the Winters Doctrine protects reserved water rights for non-
174. Seeid. at81.
175. For discussion on extending Winters to quality, see Margaret Seelye Treuer, An Indian Right
to Water Undiminished in Quality, 7 HAMLNE L REV. 347, 347-68 (1984); Robert S. Pelcyger, The
Winters Doctrine and the Greening ofthe Reservations, 4 J. CONTEMP. L. 19,34-35 (1977).
176. 920 F. Supp. 1444, 1448 (D. Ariz. 1996), aff'd, 117 F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 1997).
177. Id. at 1454-55.
178. See id. at 1448.
179. See United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., 31 F.3d 1428,1430 (9th Cir. 1994).
180. Id. at 1431.
181. See Gila Valley, 920 F. Supp. at 1448.
182. Id. at 1450-51.
183. Id. at 1454.
184. Id. at 1454-55.
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consumptive uses, such as maintenance of certain instream flows of
streams and rivers containing fish.'85 In United States v. Adair,186 the
Ninth Circuit held that because the Klamath tribe's right to fish was
preserved in the treaty establishing the reservation, water should be
reserved to fulfill this fishing purpose. 7 The Ninth Circuit held that the
fishing right required maintenance of a natural stream flow to ensure that
enough water flowed through the areas used by the tribe to fish.'88
According to the Ninth Circuit, this right was non-consumptive in nature
and prevented other water users from depleting the stream waters below
a minimum level.'89
At least one court has recognized that Winters protects the temperature
of streams. 9 In United States v. Anderson, 9' a federal district court in
the Eastern District of Washington held that Winters rights reserve water
to maintain a certain instream flow and a certain temperature. 92 The
Anderson court determined that one of the purposes of the Spokane
Indian Reservation was to preserve the tribe's access to fishing.'93 In
order to preserve this right, the temperature of the Lower Chamokane
Creek had to be maintained at sixty-eight degrees because at any higher
temperature, fish in the creek would not thrive.' The temperature of the
Creek related directly to the quantity of water flowing into the creek. 9
In sum, the Anderson court upheld a special master's recommendation on
a flow sufficient to maintain a sixty-eight degree temperature. 96
185. See United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1417 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Joint Bd. of
Control of the Flathead, Mission and Jocko Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 832 F.2d 1127, 1132
(9th Cir. 1987) (finding that treaty fishing rights allowed tribe to maintain instream flows); Colville
Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 48 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that an implied reservation
of water existed to maintain replacement fishing grounds); Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Trans-Can.
Enters., Ltd., 713 F.2d 455, 458 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that the grant of an Indian reservation
included the bed of the river and its waters).
186. 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1984).
187. See Adair, 723 F.2d at 1410; see also Colville Confederated Tribes, 647 F.2d at 47-48
(finding a fishing purpose behind a reservation established by a mere one-paragraph executive order
stating only that the land would be reserved "for said Indians").
188. See Adair, 723 F.2d at 1411, 1418.
189. Id. at 1418.
190. See United States v. Anderson, 591 F. Supp. 1, 5-6 (E.D. Wash. 1982), rev'd in part, aff'd in
part, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984).
191. 591 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Wash. 1982), rev'd in part, aff'd in part, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984)
192. See id. at5.
193. Id. at 4-5.
194. See id. at 5.
195. See id.
196. See id. at5-6-
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A strong link exists between water quantity and water quality.'97
Instream flow is directly related to water quality because without a
certain quantity of water to dilute pollutants, rivers will become too
contaminated to sustain a fish population.9 8 A minimum instream flow
of water is also imperative because reductions in flow result in increased
temperatures and poor water quality that impair fish survival and
reproduction.'99 Many times, higher quantities of water in a stream equal
a better quality of water."'
C. Courts are Divided on Whether Winters Applies to Groundwater
The U.S. Supreme Court has never directly considered whether
Winters applies to groundwater and lower courts are divided on the issue.
Although the Ninth Circuit held that reserved water rights include
groundwater in United States v. Cappaert,2°' the U.S. Supreme Court did
not reach this conclusion on appeal because it determined that the water
at issue was surface water, not groundwater.0 2 The Supreme Court of
Wyoming, when confronted with this issue, refused to extend Winters to
groundwater because no court had ever done so.23 In contrast, the
Supreme Court of Arizona held that Winters extends to groundwater
because of the policies behind Winters.2
1. United States v. Cappaert
In United States v. Cappaert,20° the Ninth Circuit extended Winters to
groundwater." 6 Although the U.S. Supreme Court did not reach this
197. See PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Wash. Dept. of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 719 (1994)
(recognizing that vrater quality is closely related to water quantity); COHEN, supra note 24, at 587;
NAT'L WATER COMM'N, supra note 76, at 4; TARLOCK, supra note 18, at 2-8 (recognizing that if
water quality is to be improved, water use must be limited).
198. See supra note PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County, 511 U.S. at 719, NAT'L WATER COMM'N,
supra note 76, at 4; TARLOCK, supra note 18, at 2-8.
199. Telephone Interview with Greg Johnston, Certified Fisheries Professional (July 20, 2002);
see also Anderson, 591 F. Supp. at 5; COHEN, supra note 24, at 587.
200. See PUD No. I of Jefferson County, 511 U.S. at 719, NAT'L WATER COMM'N, supra note
76, at 4; TARLOCK, supra note 18, at 2-8.
201. See United States v. Cappaert, 508 F.2d 313, 317 (9th Cir. 1974).
202. See United States v. Cappaert, 426 U.S. 128, 142 (1976).
203. See Big Hom, 753 P.2d 76,99-100 (Wyo. 1988).
204. See Gila I1, 989 P.2d 739, 747 (Ariz. 1999).
205. 508 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1974).
206. Id. at 317.
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issue on appeal, the Ninth Circuit's reasoning continues to be
persuasive. 21 7 Cappaert involved a non-Indian federal reservation called
Devil's Hole." 8 The reservation housed a cavern containing a pool with a
rare species of desert fish.209 The case arose when ranch owners began
pumping groundwater from an underground aquifer that was also the
source of water for the unique Devil's Hole pool.210 The United States
sued to enjoin the ranch owners from pumping in several locations
because it harmed the survival of the rare fish."' The United States
argued that the 1952 proclamation reserving the pool from public domain
contained an implied right to enough groundwater to assure the
preservation of the rare fish. 12 The defendant ranch owners denied that
Devil's Hole reserved any water rights for the United States and asserted
that Winters rights did not apply to groundwater.
The Ninth Circuit disagreed and explicitly extended the Winters
Doctrine to groundwater.1 4 The court held that it made no difference
where the waters were located.2 l5 The court reasoned that the purpose of
the federal reservation was to assure that the pool would not suffer
changes in its condition. 6 Because the pool and the rare fish were
located underground, the Ninth Circuit determined that in order to
protect the reservation's purpose, it had to extend Winters to
207. See, e.g., E. Brendan Shane, Note, Water Rights and Gila River III: The Winters Doctrine
Goes Underground, 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 397, 403-04 (2001).
208. See Cappaert, 508 F.2d at 313. The Winters Doctrine arose in an Indian reservation context
but applies to all federally reserved lands. The federal government has reserved land for many
purposes such as for Indian reservations, military reservations, or to establish national forests, parks,
or monuments. See. e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 718 (1978) (holding that a
reserved right existed to preserve timber in national forest); United States v. Dist. Court for Eagle
County, 401 U.S. 520, 522-23 (1971) (holding that the federal government's authority to reserve
lands extended to any federal enclave); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600-01 (1963) (holding
that the federal government impliedly reserved enough water to fulfill the purposes of the Indian
reservations and non-Indian federal land in the area); Fed. Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435,
448 (1955) (implying that federal reserved lands are not subject to state water law).
209. Cappaert, 508 F.2d at 313-16.
210. Id. at 315-16.
211. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 134 (1976).
212. See Cappaert, 508 F.2d at 318.
213. Id. at 317.
214. See id.
215. See id. (citing Tweedy v. Tex. Co., 286 F. Supp. 383,385 (D. Mont. 1968)).
216. Id. at 318.
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groundwater.2"7 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the purpose of the
reservation was more important that the location of the water source." 8
The Ninth Circuit rejected the defendants' argument that under
Nevada law a landowner has dominion over all water beneath his or her
property.2 9 The Cappaert court noted that Nevada groundwater rights
were governed by the prior appropriation doctrine until a 1913 Nevada
statute declared that the water belonged to the public and required
groundwater permits."2° The defendants did not begin using the
groundwater until 1968."2 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that they had not
established a water right under prior appropriation before the Nevada
statute came into effect.' Further, the court dismissed the state of
Nevada's argument that state water laws bind the federal government
with respect to federal reservations.2" The court held that state water law
does not apply to federal reservations and that an implied reserved water
right existed to sustain the rare fish. 4 The Ninth Circuit remanded the
case with instructions to act to preserve the pool's water level and protect
the rare fish.
225
On appeal the U. S. Supreme Court avoided ruling on the Ninth
Circuit's conclusion that Winters applies to groundwater by holding that
the pool was surface water, not groundwater. 6 After examining the
Proclamation establishing the reservation, the Supreme Court reasoned
that one of the purposes of the reservation was to preserve the scientific
interest of the pool. 27 Because the surface water and groundwater are
"physically interrelated as integral parts of the hydrologic cycle," 8 the
Court determined that the ranch owners' pumping threatened the fish,
and thereby prevented the reservation from fulfilling its scientific
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. Id. at 319.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See id. at 320.
224. See id.
225. See id. at 322.
226. United States v. Cappaert, 426 U.S. 128, 142 (1976). Tribes can also claim groundwater
based on ownership of the overlying land. See TARLOCK, supra note 18, at 9-81. This claim is
beyond the scope of this Comment.
227. See Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 140-41.
228. Id. at 142 (internal quotations omitted).
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purpose.129 The Court stated that, "since the implied-reservation-of-
water-rights doctrine is based on the necessity of water for the purpose of
the federal reservation, we hold that the United States can protect its
water from subsequent diversion, whether the diversion is of surface or
ground water."" 0 The Supreme Court recognized that when diversions
from groundwater hinder the purpose of the reservation, pumping can be
enjoined. 3 Although the Supreme Court did not consider the Ninth
Circuit's conclusion, at least one court has found the Supreme Court's
rationale to be persuasive enough to include groundwater in Winters
rights. 23
2
2. The Supreme Court of Wyoming Has Refused to Extend Winters to
Groundwater
In In re the General Adjudication ofAll Rights to Use Water in the Big
Horn River System [hereinafter Big Horn], the Supreme Court of
Wyoming considered an action to determine all Indian water rights in the
Big Horn River drainage basin in western Wyoming. 23 The basin
encompassed the Wind River Indian Reservation as well as parts of
Yellowstone National Park and various other national forests and
parks." The case arose from a special master's general adjudication that
had been divided into three phases, including Indian reserved water
rights, non-Indian reserved water rights, and state water rights.s On
appeal, the Big Horn court examined the special master's decision
regarding the Indian reserved water rights 36 The main issues on appeal
were how to quantify the water and for what purposes. 37 The United
States and the tribes also claimed a Winters right to the groundwater,
229. See id. at 142-43.
230. Id. at 143; see also New Mexico v. Aamodt, 618 F. Supp. 993, 1010 (D.N.M. 1985) (stating
that the surface water and groundwater of the stream system at issue were interrelated and therefore
the Pueblos had a prior right to use groundwater as well); Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton,
460 F. Supp. 1320, 1325 (E.D. Wash. 1978), aff'd inpart, rev'd inpart, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981)
(stating that Winters rights "extend to ground water as well as surface water").
231. See Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 143.
232. See Walton, 460 F. Supp. at 1326.
233. See Big Horn, 753 P.2d 76, 83 (Wyo. 1988).
234. Id. at 83.
235. See Peg Rogers, Note, In re Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River, 30 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 439, 442 (1990).
236. Id.
237. See Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 88-112.
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even though surface water from the Big Horn River System was
available to the tribes 38
Regarding groundwater, the Wyoming Supreme Court stated that
because groundwater and surface water are often interconnected, "[t]he
logic which supports a reservation of surface water to fulfill the purpose
of the reservation also supports reservation of groundwater." ' 9 However,
the Big Horn court refused to extend Winters to groundwater because
"not a single case applying the reserved water doctrine to groundwater"
had been cited.24 Because of the lack of strong precedent, the court
refused to break new ground.24" ' One commentator has suggested that the
court may have refused to extend Winters because of the possible
implications for state law that would result.242 Changing the established
state law would impact many of the more than twenty-thousand water
users who were affected by the Big Horn adjudications.243
3. The Supreme Court of Arizona Extended Winters to Groundwater
The Supreme Court of Arizona extended the Winters Doctrine to
groundwater in In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water
In the Gila River System and Source [hereinafter Gila 111].244 The court
conducted a general adjudication to determine the rights of all water
claimants asserting rights to use water from the Gila River system.245
Specifically, the court considered whether federal reserved rights include
groundwater.2' The petitioners argued that the court should "decline to
extend the doctrine to groundwater out of deference to state water law"
and that deferring to state law would not defeat federal water rights
because Arizona state law allowed overlying landowners an equal right
to pump as much groundwater as they could put to reasonable use.247
238. See id. at 99-107 (adjudicating the right to groundwater and quantifying the amount of
surface water for the Wind River Indian Reservation).
239. Id. at 99.
240. Id.
241. See id.
242. See Shane, supra note 207, at 403.
243. See Rogers, supra note 235, at 434.
244. See Gila III, 989 P.2d 739,745 (Ariz.1999).
245. See id. at 742.
246. See id.
247. See id. at 747-48.
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Unlike the Big Horn court, the Gila III court found guidance in
Winters and Cappaert.2 18 Referring to Big Horn, the Supreme Court of
Arizona stated the fact "[t]hat no previous court has come to grips with
an issue does not relieve a present court... of the obligation to do so." '49
The Arizona court found the reasoning in Winters, that arid reservation
land is valueless without water, to be persuasive and held that it
supported an implied right to groundwater."' 0 Recognizing that some
reservations do not have surface water to sustain life, the court insisted
that certain reservations must be able to pump groundwater in order to
make their arid land workable.25" ' The Supreme Court of Arizona
reasoned that if Winters reserved water to use for the purpose of the
reservation, and groundwater was the only water source, then Winters
must apply to groundwater. 2 That notion, combined with the
acknowledgment from Cappaert of the interrelated nature of
groundwater and surface water, led the court to determine "that if, the
United States implicitly intended, when it established reservations, to
reserve sufficient unappropriated water to meet the reservations' needs, it
must have intended that reservation water to come from whatever
particular sources each reservation had at hand." 3 Consequently, the
Supreme Court of Arizona held that groundwater can be an implied
reserved water right under Winters.
In response to the petitioners' arguments that the Supreme Court of
Arizona should defer to state water law, the Gila III court concluded that
it could not defer to state law when doing so would defeat federal water
rights.7s4 Arizona state law interfered with the federal water rights
because under the Arizona system, groundwater would have eventually
become depleted.255 The state had consumed "more groundwater than
nature [could] replenish. 256 The Supreme Court of Arizona limited its
holding, however, by stating that the reserved right to groundwater only
exists "where other waters are inadequate to accomplish the purpose of a
reservation. 2'57 Thus, in Gila III the Supreme Court of Arizona stated
248. See id. at 746.
249. Id. at 745.
250. See id. at 746.
251. Id.
252. See id. at 747.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 747-48.
255. See id. at 748.
256. Id.
257. Id.
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that the adequacy of the other waters and the purpose of a reservation
must be determined on a case-by-case basis."s
In sum, despite the Supreme Court of Wyoming's refusal to include
groundwater in the scope of Winters rights in Big Horn, the Supreme
Court of Arizona has in Gila HI expressly extended Winters to
groundwater. The Gila III court's rationale is consistent with the U.S.
Supreme Court's holding in Cappaert that groundwater diversions can be
enjoined if the purpose of the reservation is compromised. Both courts
determined that the purpose of the reservation is more important than the
location of the water source.
IV. WTNTERS RESERVES WATER OF A QUANTITY AND
QUALITY SUFFICIENT TO FULFILL THE PURPOSES OF
THE RESERVATION, INCLUDING GROUNDWATER FOR
HATCHERIES WHEN SURFACE WATER IS INADEQUATE
The reserved water rights doctrine should mandate a quality of water
sufficient to support the purposes of a reservation." The holding in
Winters, that tribes are allowed water sufficient to fulfill the purposes of
the reservation," along with its rationale, and the Canons of
Construction,"' support this conclusion. In addition, courts have already
implied a right to water quality in cases granting water for instream flows
and water temperature. 262 When surface water is inadequate due to
quality problems or the expense of obtaining such supplies, groundwater
should be awarded to tribes because reservation purposes cannot be
fulfilled without water from an underground source.26
Applying these general premises to the case of the Lummi Nation
leads to the conclusion that groundwater use should be awarded to the
Lummi. Their homeland and fishing purposes are threatened because the
surface water available to them is of inadequate quality to maintain the
purposes of the reservation2 4 and the groundwater quality is threatened
258. Id.
259. See Treuer, supra note 175, at 368.
260. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S.
564,576-77 (1908).
261. See Winters, 207 U.S. at 576-77.
262. See United States v. Anderson, 591 F. Supp. 1, 5 (E.D. Wash. 1982), rev'd in part, aff'd in
part, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1411 (9th Cir. 1956).
263. See Gila III, 989 P.2d 739,745 (Ariz. 1999).
264. United States' Complaint, United States v. Washington, Western District of Washington, 8-9
(Jan. 19, 2001) (No. C01-0047Z).
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by overuse.25 Therefore, the Lummi should be able to enjoin users that
threaten the quality of the groundwater they receive.
A. Winters Rights Should Entitle Fishing Tribes to Water of a Quality
Sufficient to Fulfill the Fishing Purpose of the Reservation
Winters should extend to water quality for two reasons. First, the rule
and rationale in Winters require courts to award water to Indian tribes in
order to fulfill the purposes of a reservation.266 Second, courts have
established a strong relationship between water quantity and quality.267
1. Winters's Holding and Rationale Support Extending Reserved
Water Rights to Water Quality
Water quality is required in order to comply with the holding in
Winters. In Winters, the U.S. Supreme Court guaranteed a tribe's right to
water sufficient to maintain the purposes of the reservation. 8 The Court
contemplated the fact that arid Indian lands are uninhabitable without
water.269 The purpose of reserving these lands was to allow tribes the
right to make these lands prosperous. 2" This could not be done without
water, nor could it be done with poor water. Thus, courts should grant
tribes an implied right to water of sufficient quality to fulfill the purposes
of their reservations under Winters.
Without a right to water quality, Winters rights would be meaningless.
The goal in Winters was to allow tribes water to make their land valuable
and fulfill the purposes of their reservations.27' Not upholding a quality
of water frustrates this goal because the purposes of reservations,
whether they be homeland, fishing, or agricultural, cannot be fulfilled
with polluted or otherwise unsatisfactory water.272 Crops do not grow,
fish to not swim, and people do not survive without water of a minimum
quality.273 If tribes need water of a sufficient quality to support the
265. Id.
266. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 175-200 and accompanying text.
268. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908); Cappaert v. United States, 426
U.S. 128, 141 (1976).
269. See Winters, 207 U.S. at 576.
270. See id.
271. See id.
272. See Treuer, supra note 175, at 368.
273. See, e.g., id. at 365-67.
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purpose of the reservation, Winters requires an implied right to water
quality. 4 Thus, denying tribal injunctions against activities that pollute
tribal waters violates the reserved water rights theory because an
inadequate quality of water prevents the purposes of the reservation from
being fulfilled.
The right to quality water should trump non-Indian users' water rights
because of the priority attached to federally reserved water rights under
the prior appropriation doctrine. The priority date for Winters rights is
the date of the reservation's establishment, and sometimes time
immemorial.275 Because of this early priority date on reservations, Indian
water users almost always trump non-Indian water diverters. 276 In water
shortages, non-Indians must cease using the water.' r Many times,
decreased quantities of water result in poor quality water.278 Thus, when
quality is poor and cannot be used to fulfill the purpose of a reservation,
there is in fact a water shortage. Therefore, tribes should be able to
enjoin non-Indian diverters when water quality is poor.
Winters relied on the Canons of Construction, which require courts to
resolve ambiguities in favor of the Indians and look at the treaty from the
Indians' standpoint.279 The dispute in Winters arose because no mention
was made regarding water in the agreement establishing the
reservation."' This ambiguity permitted two possible inferences: (1) by
signing the agreement, the Indians gave up their water rights, or (2) water
rights were implied in the agreement because the purpose of the
reservation, to become civilized and pastoral, could not be met without
water rights.28' This ambiguity was resolved in favor of the Indians and
the latter inference was accepted. 82 Looking at the dilemma from the
Indians' standpoint, the Winters Court found that, when agreeing to give
up land and live on a reservation pursuant to a treaty, the Indians would
not have given up the waters that made the reservation valuable and
adequate.283 When considering water quality, courts must look at treaties
274. See Treuer, supra note 175, at 365-68.
275. See United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1412-15 (1984).
276. See supra note 122.
277. See TARLOCK, supra note 18, at 5-49.
278. See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
279. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77; Wilkinson, supra note 44, at 608-19.
280. See Winters, 207 U.S. at 576-77.
281. Seeid.
282. Id.
283. Id.
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from the standpoint of the Indians and resolve all ambiguities in the
Indians' favor.284 Courts should conclude that because Indians would not
have given up the means to make their land valuable, and water of poor
quality makes their land valueless, Indians would not have interpreted
the establishment of their reservation to imply that polluted water would
be satisfactory even though their land remained valueless and its
possibilities limited.
2. Courts Have Preserved Water Quality Through Reservation of
Water Quantity
Courts have already acted to preserve water quality by making
changes in water quantity.28 By restricting withdrawals from junior
users, the Ninth Circuit in Adair has reserved minimum instream flows
where fishing is a primary purpose, thereby preserving water quality for
non-consumptive uses.286 In addition, a federal district court in the
Eastern District of Washington in Anderson held that the Winters right
extends to maintain a certain instream flow and a certain temperature to
preserve a fishing purpose.287 Although these courts did not expressly
extend Winters to imply a certain water quality, applying their rationale
and results suggests that Winters does reserve quality as well as quantity.
Fish need a certain quantity of water in the streams so that pollutants are
diluted and temperatures are minimized.288 Without a certain water
quantity, the water is of an inadequate quality to support fish life.289
Courts should account for water quality when determining quantity
because tribes need a sufficient quality to accomplish the fishing
purposes of their reservations. Courts must determine the amount of
water necessary to sustain fishing and if water quality is poor, then they
must reserve more water instream flows until fish can thrive.290 Instream
flow is directly related to water quality because without a certain flow,
284. See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
285. See United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1417-18 (1984); United States v. Anderson, 591
F. Supp. 1, 5 (E.D. Wash. 1982), rev'd inpart, aff'd inpart, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984).
286. See Adair, 723 F.2d at 1417-18.
287. See Anderson, 591 F. Supp. at 5.
288. See PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Wash. Dept. of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 719 (1994);
NAT'L WATER COMM'N, supra note 76, at 4; TARLOCK, supra note 18, at 2-8.
289. See PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County, 511 U.S. at 719; NAT'L WATER COMM'N, supra note
76, at 4; TARLOCK, supra note 18, at 2-8.
290. See supra notes 185-200 and accompanying text.
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rivers will become too contaminated or too warm to sustain a fish
population.29" '
Further, quality water should be guaranteed for consumptive uses as
well. For example, under the PIA standard, courts quantify enough water
to irrigate the irrigable acreage.292 In adjudicating water rights, courts
should reduce the amount of water allocated to non-Indian users if the
quality of water is insufficient to allow crops to grow on the Indian
reservations. Gila Valley best illustrates this situation. "3 Although the
case dealt with a Consent Decree instead of Winters rights, it enjoined
non-Indian users in order to restore the water to a quality sufficient to
sustain the salt-sensitive crops that were grown by the tribe at the time of
the Decree.' 4 Thus, water quality was implied when a certain water
quantity was granted under the Consent Decree.
In sum, many factors support the extension of the Winters Doctrine to
water quality for fisheries, most importantly, the holding of Winters, that
tribes are allowed water sufficient to fulfill the purposes of the
reservation. In addition, the Canons of Construction for Indian treaties,
relied on in Winters, apply to situations involving water quality.
Moreover, several courts have implied that water quality accompanies
water rights by holding that tribes can maintain minimum instream flows
and certain temperatures of rivers in order to dilute pollution and ensure
fish survival. Consequently, courts should extend the Winters doctrine to
include water quality.
B. Winters Rights Extend to Groundwater When Surface Water is
Inadequate to Fulfill the Purposes of the Reservation
Washington, and other states with fishing tribes, should apply the
Winters Doctrine to groundwater for several reasons. First, the U.S.
Supreme Court acknowledged the connection between surface water and
groundwater in Cappaert v. United States.29 Second, the only opinion
holding that there is no reserved right to groundwater, Big Horn, is not
291. See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
292. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963).
293. See supra notes 179-184 and accompanying text.
294. See United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., 920 F. Supp. 1444, 1454-55 (D. Ariz.
1996).
295. 426 U.S. 128, 143 (1976).
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persuasive or binding. 6 Third, some reservation purposes cannot be met
without groundwater.297
In Cappaert, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "the United States can
protect its water from subsequent diversion, whether the diversion is of
surface or ground water."2 98 The Court acknowledged the strong
connection between groundwater and surface water.2 99 When one source
is overused, the other source suffers."' Courts should not differentiate
between depleted groundwater or depleted surface water when
adjudicating reserved water rights issues because groundwater and
surface water are so interconnected.
Besides the favorable language from the U.S. Supreme Court, Winters
rights should include groundwater because the only court to refuse to
extend Winters rights to groundwater is not persuasive. In Big Horn, the
Supreme Court of Wyoming declined to extend Winters rights to
groundwater because the parties had not cited a case where a court had
included groundwater in Winters rights.30' Big Horn's rationale is no
longer accurate since the Gila III court expressly extended Winters to
groundwater.30 2 Further, a court should not shirk its responsibility to
analyze and rule on legal issues purely because no other court has done
SO 3
03
In addition, Big Horn can be distinguished from cases involving other
fishing tribes with the need for quality groundwater. Adequate surface
water was available to the agricultural reservation in Big Horn.3 4
Although the court did not indicate that availability of surface water was
a reason for refusing to extend Winters to groundwater, the court
awarded ample surface water to the tribes in Big Horn. 5 This shows that
perhaps the purpose of the reservation in Big Horn was already being
fulfilled with surface water and groundwater was not necessary. Thus,
Big Horn is not persuasive because the reasoning is flawed and the facts
296. See Big Horn, 753 P.2d 76,99 (Wyo. 1988).
297. See Gila 111, 989 P.2d 739, 746 (Ariz. 1999); Cappaert v. United States, 508 F.2d 313, 317
(9th Cir. 1974).
298. Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 143.
299. See id. at 142.
300. See id.
301. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 99.
302. See Gila 111, 989 P.2d at 747.
303. See id. at 745.
304. See Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 99-107.
305. See id.
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are distinguishable from cases involving tribes depending on
groundwater for their only adequate water source.
The third reason to include groundwater in Winters rights is the
importance courts have placed on the purpose of a reservation. If surface
water does not satisfy the purposes of a reservation, groundwater must be
reserved if it is available."' Using the Supreme Court's decisions in
Winters and Cappaert as "guidepost[s]," the Gila III court asserted that it
was illogical that Winters would not apply to reservations that lacked
streams and instead depended on groundwater.0 7 In Winters, the Court
reserved an implied water right without limiting where the water was
found."0 Thus, as the Gila HI court articulated, "[tihe significant
question ... is not whether the water runs above or below the ground but
whether it is necessary to accomplish the purpose of the reservation."
309
Some tribes have only one natural source of freshwater to use for
drinking, hatcheries, and other homeland purposes.3 10 It makes little
sense to allow a reserved right to tribes whose land runs appurtenant to
adequate surface water, but not to tribes whose land lies above a
groundwater source. An implied water right is an implied right to any
water necessary to fulfill the purposes of the reservation, no matter the
source.
The Supreme Court of Arizona's holding is buttressed by the Ninth
Circuit's declaration in Cappaert that, "the United States may reserve not
only surface water, but also underground water."3'' The Ninth Circuit
found that it made no difference whether the water was found on the
surface of the land or under it. 3 2 Although the holding was never
affirmed by the Supreme Court on review, the Ninth Circuit's view is
persuasive because Winters guarantees water sufficient to fulfill the
purposes of the reservation and tribes without surface water must
sometimes use groundwater to fulfill these purposes. Because
groundwater and surface water are intricately related and both are
sometimes required in order to fulfill purposes of reservations, Winters
rights should include groundwater.
306. See Gila II, 989 P.2d at 747.
307. See id. at 746-47.
305. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564,576-77 (1908).
309. See Gila 11, 989 P.2d at 747.
310. See United States' Complaint, United States v. Washington, Western District of Washington,
8-9 (Jan. 19, 2001) (No. CO1-0047Z).
311. See Cappaert v. United States, 508 F.2d 313, 317 (9th Cir. 1974).
312. See id. (citing Tweedy v. Tex. Co., 286 F. Supp. 383,385 (D. Mont. 1968)).
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C. The Lummi Nation is Entitled to Enjoin Other Users to Protect the
Quality of Their Reserved Water Rights in Groundwater
The Winters Doctrine should be extended to allow the Lummi to
protect the quality of their groundwater. The Lummi reservation has a
fishing purpose that must be fulfilled.3"' Because surface water is
inadequate to fulfill some fishing activities, like hatcheries, the Lummi
need to use the groundwater underlying the reservation? 4 However, this
groundwater is becoming contaminated by overuse.3 5 Under Winters, the
Lummi should be able to enjoin non-Indian groundwater pumpers until
the groundwater is of a sufficient quality to maintain the fish hatcheries.
The Lummi Nation is entitled to the quantity and quality of water to
fulfill the fishing purposes of its reservation. Fishing has historically
been and still is the primary way of life for the Lummi.3 6 The 1855
Treaty of Point Elliott,317 the agreement establishing the Lummi
reservation, confirmed the importance of fishing in Article V allowing
Lummi to take fish in usual and accustomed places.3" This provision
demonstrates that the U.S. government meant to preserve a fishing way
of life. Like the tribe in Adair, the Lummi Nation deserves water rights
sufficient to satisfy this fishing purpose,31 9 including preserving instream
flows and maintaining fish hatcheries.2
Because the Lummi's fish hatcheries cannot be maintained with the
polluted surface water available to the tribe,321 the Lummi should be
entitled to clean groundwater for hatcheries. The tribe is entitled to
groundwater because surface water is inadequate to fulfill the purpose of
313. See infra notes 316-320 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
315. See United States' Complaint, United States v. Washington, Western District of Washington,
8-9 (Jan. 19,2001) (No. C01-0047Z).
316. See Don Newman Taylor, Changes In The Economy Of the Lummi Indians of Northwest
Washington 16 (1969) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Western Washington University) (on file with
author); Kurt Russo, The Lummi Indian Tribe and Life with the Salmon, at
http:llwww.sustainable.org/casestudies/washington/WAafLummi.html (last modified Sept. 18,
1996).
317. 12 Stat. 927 (January 22, 1855).
318. Id. at art. V.
319. See United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1417-18 (9th Cir. 1984).
320. See Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 48 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that
fishing purpose includes replacement fisheries). The result would possibly be the same if the court
used the legal analysis set forth in Gila IV after finding a homeland purpose of the reservation.
However, that analysis is beyond the scope of this Comment.
321. See United States' Complaint, United States v. Washington, Western District of Washington,
8-9 (Jan. 19,2001) (No. C01-0047Z).
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the reservation.3" The Gila III court declared that when the Supreme
Court in Winters found an implied right to water for federal reservations,
it must have intended the water to come from whatever sources each
reservation had at hand.3 ' The Lummi Nation has a groundwater source
at hand to fulfill the fishing purposes of its reservation324 and can protect
its water from subsequent diversion, whether the diversion is of surface
water or groundwater.3z
The Lummi Nation should be entitled to enjoin junior users from
pumping until the water is no longer contaminated with saltwater
intrusion. Under Winters, the Lummi are entitled to water to fulfill the
purposes of the reservation.326 The purposes of the Lummi reservation
are not being met without uncontaminated groundwater.3 7 The purposes
can only be fulfilled if the non-Indian users are enjoined from pumping
the groundwater.
The Canons of Construction, used as the rationale for Winters, also
support an injunction. The Treaty of Point Elliot, which established the
Lummi reservation, must be construed from the standpoint of the
Lummi.3 8 The Lummi would not have understood the Treaty as giving
up the right to water quality sufficient to sustain their fishing lifestyle.
Like the tribe in Winters, the Lummi would not have believed that the
Treaty required them to give up the means to make their land
prosperous. 29 Here, the Lummi require access to high quality water as
the means to make their land prosperous.
Just like in Winters, an ambiguity exists in the Treaty establishing the
Lummi reservation, because no mention of water or water quality
exists.33° Two inferences could be made from this fact. First, it could be
inferred that by signing the treaty, the Lummi gave up its prior
landholdings without reserving good quality water. Second, it could be
inferred that the Lummi realized that the purpose of the reservation, to
become civilized and prosperous using a fishing lifestyle, would only be
met with quality water for fish survival and such a water right must be
322. See id.
323. See Gila III, 989 P.2d 739,747 (Ariz. 1999).
324. See United States' Complaint at 8, Washington (No. C01-0047Z).
325. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 143 (1976).
326. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908); Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 141.
327. See United States' Complaint at 8-9, Washington (No. C01-0047Z).
328. See Winters, 207 U.S. at 576-77; see also Wilkinson, supra not6 44, at 608-19.
329. See Winters, 207 U.S. at 577.
330. See id. at 576-77; 12 Stat. 927 (January 22, 1855).
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implied. Because this ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the Indians,
the latter inference must be accepted because it is more favorable to the
Indians, under the Canons of Construction.
In sum, Winters rights give Indian tribes like the Lummi Nation
priority over non-Indian water users. The Winters Doctrine guarantees
water sufficient to fulfill the purposes of a reservation. Therefore, when
these purposes are threatened by poor quality water, tribes like the
Lummi are entitled to enjoin non-Indian users contributing to the
contamination. Considering water quality issues from the standpoint of
the Indians should lead courts to the conclusion that Indians would not
have given up their land in exchange for reservations with poor water.
V. CONCLUSION
The Winters Doctrine gives tribes an implied right to water to fulfill
the purposes of their reservations. Although no court has extended
Winters to imply a certain quality of water, many factors support such a
notion. Without adequate water quality, reservation purposes cannot be
fulfilled, in violation of Winters. The Canons of Construction for
agreements with Indians also require a liberal view of the water quality
issue: tribes would not have given up the quality of water needed to
make their reservations prosperous. In addition, courts have recognized
the strong link between water quality and quantity by granting tribes
non-consumptive water rights to increase river flows and dilute
pollutants.
When surface water is inadequate, the purposes of reservations must
be fulfilled by the sources available, including groundwater sources. The
Winters Doctrine is an implied right to water, no matter the source. The
Supreme Court has expressly recognized the strong hydrologic
connection between surface water and groundwater in Cappaert.
Tribes, like the Lummi of Western Washington, should be able to
enjoin overuse of their water sources. Surface water on the Lummi
Nation's reservation is inadequate to fulfill all of the fishing purposes of
the reservation. Therefore, the Lummi should be entitled to groundwater.
Since the Lummi's groundwater source is becoming contaminated
through overuse, the Lummi should be able to enjoin non-Indian junior
users from pumping the groundwater source. This analysis should be
applied to other Northwest fishing tribes facing similar problems.
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